ARCHIVED - Administrative Archaelogy: The Public Service Commission and the Management of Human Resources in the Federal Public Service
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A Paper Presented at The Hodgetts Legacy: Towards the Future
Queen's University, Kingston
October 23, 2009
Public Service Commission of Canada
Director General, Integration, Coordination & Library
Public Service Commission of Canada
When Professor Ted Hodgetts passed away, at age 91, in the spring of 2009, both the academy and the federal public service lost a legendary figure. Over the course of more than 70 years, Ted made a unique contribution to scholarship and our understanding of public administration and to improving governance and the well-being of Canadians. As one of the contributors to the 1982 collection of essays in his honour put it, Ted was "a marvelous balance between the academic and the applied, the bookish and the practical".1
Ted was a chronicler par excellence. His dabbling in "administrative archaeology", as he sometimes called it, brought the past and future of public administration to life for at least several generations of academics, students and public servants. The role of the liberal democratic state - and the place of an independent bureaucracy in it - was always paramount in his analysis. Ted also always ensured that the human dimension of public administration was front and centre.
Ted's nuanced histories and advice about the organization and administration of government were both inspirational and influential. After first studying royal commissions as an instrument of government, he turned his attention to being a real-time participant in the use of the instrument. His contributions to the Glassco Royal Commission on Government Organization and the Lambert Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability left their thumb-print on Canadian administrative history and on the federal public service through to today.2
Ted's administrative histories and his advice on the organization and administration of government also provided the basis for his status as a special friend of the Public Service Commission (PSC). The PSC is the independent agency responsible for safeguarding, on behalf of Parliament and Canadians, a professional, merit-based, non-partisan federal public service.
Ted co-authored the seminal 1972 study of the PSC's predecessor organization, the Civil Service Commission. The Biography of an Institution remains the book to read about the origins of Canada's merit-based, non-partisan public service.3 It was commissioned by the late John Carson, the Chairman of the PSC from 1965 to 1976, as part of the major reforms he led to modernize staffing in the federal public service, which resulted in the first Public Service Employment Act (PSEA) in 1967. The book has provided important guidance to subsequent Presidents of the PSC ever since, including, for the current President, on the role of commissioners. The PSC facilitated the publication of a sequel to The Biography of an Institution - Defending a Contested Ideal: Merit and the PSC of Canada, 1908-2008, by Luc Julliet and Ken Rasmussen - to mark the PSC's centenary in 2008.4
Ted was also a special friend of the PSC because he was a long-standing, highly regarded champion for core public service values - and for the federal public service.
This paper focuses on Ted's vision of the PSC as part of the landscape of federal human resources management and Canadian parliamentary government. Over the course of his long life, Ted made many important observations and recommendations regarding the PSC. The paper starts by revisiting a few of these and showing just how much the PSC of today reflects his vision. It then explores several issues where, if Ted were here today, the PSC would be looking to him for advice and counsel.
Ted's Vision of the PSC
1. The Normative Elements
Ted taught us a lot about the importance of being a guardian. Key for him was the idea that, for the PSC to be an effective guardian of Canada's public service, there must be a fundamental appreciation for what the federal public service is and what the implications are for human resources management in the federal government. On this, Ted had much to say.5
The Federal Public Service and Liberal Democracy
For Ted, the federal public service was first and foremost an essential aspect of liberal democracy and Canada's constitutional framework. Much of his work was premised on the instrumental and beneficent role of the public service.6 An independent bureaucracy was, for him, a cornerstone of an efficient, well-functioning liberal democratic state – as was a clear demarcation of the respective roles and responsibilities of that bureaucracy and the elected government. Not surprisingly, his view of public administration was firmly grounded in the core governing principles of Canada. He always rooted his analysis in federalism, our Westminster-inspired system of Parliamentary government, a concern about representativeness and, after 1982, the Charter.
Ted was one of the first to describe the rise of the administrative state in Canada.7 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, he showed us the important shift in the balance of political power that was taking place, from Parliament, provincial legislatures and Ministers, to non-elected public servants. He called this phenomenon "bureaucracy as leviathan". The leviathan was not dangerous per se. Rather, it demanded a heightened focus on ensuring effective control and accountability and putting in place new approaches for holding an ever-growing public service to account to Parliament and to Canadians. Ted recognized that control was a way to ensure Canadians continued to benefit from a merit-based, non-partisan public service.
Human Resources Management in the Federal Government is Different
Ted's normative framework for public administration also recognized the distinctive nature of human resources management in the federal government. In the 1980s, a number of scholars invested much intellectual energy in exploring whether management in the public and private sectors was more alike or more different. For Ted, there was no question. Writing with Ned Franks, he put it this way: "Human resources management in the Canadian system of government is not like human resources management in private industry, nor is it like governments in other systems such as the American which operate under different structures of power".8
For Ted, there were two distinguishing features of government employment. The first was the principle of merit. As he wrote, again with Ned Franks: 'Merit' for the public service means, in addition to requiring competence and qualifications for the job, the absence of patronage […] and non-partisanship […] Merit, in these two senses, is a requirement unique to government".9
The other key feature of HRM was the notion of equity: On this, he (with Franks) said: "'Equity' means the government's intention that the public service should reflect the diversity of Canadian society, and that the public service should be a model employer, in terms of employing groups that are disadvantaged in society".10
A very "Hodgettsonian" view of the essential nature of the public service and HRM in the federal government is the cornerstone of the Public Service Employment Act and the broader HRM landscape. In the debates leading up to passage of the Public Service Modernization Act, including the PSEA, in late 2003, the Honourable Lucienne Robillard, then President of the Treasury Board, stated that: "as a public institution, the public service is not, and cannot be managed in the same way as a business".11 Further echoing Hodgetts's normative framework, she went on to say that, as such, the public service "is, and must be, subject to greater scrutiny in its hiring and management practices."12 The Preamble to the PSEA itself recognizes the public service as a unique resource "whose members are drawn from across the country, reflect[ing] a myriad of backgrounds, skills and professions", and the Government of Canada's commitment to a public service that "is characterized by fair, transparent employment practices."13
The Preamble establishes the values upon which staffing in the public serviced is to be based. This has been confirmed most recently in a decision by the Federal Court in July of this year. In the case known as Lavigne, the Court determined that: "La discretion dans l'exercice du pouvoir est restreinte par les principes motivants de la LEFP, qui sont décrits dans le préambule." 14
The PSEA gives the PSC its mandate. Under the Act, Parliament and Canadians rely on the PSC to ensure Canada continues to benefit from a public service that is based on the core values of merit and non-partisanship.
Based on the Preamble, the PSC also ensures that staffing decisions are guided by the values of fairness, access, transparency and representativeness. By carefully discharging these responsibilities, the PSC plays a vital role in safeguarding Canada's federal public service as an important public institution in the broader system of Parliamentary government and liberal democracy.
2. The Design Elements
Against this normative backdrop, Ted paid the utmost attention to the practical design of the PSC. What roles, responsibilities and tools does the PSC need to fulfill its mandate to Parliament and Canadians? In numerous articles, books, studies and reports, he set out what he saw as the essential elements. While his thinking evolved over the course of his career, the essence remained much the same.
As Ted noted, the PSC is the Canadian solution to the demand of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility and the need for ministers to stay out of the day-to-day business of human resources management in their departments. Under the PSEA, the PSC is responsible for appointments to and within the core public service, for ensuring merit in these appointments and preventing patronage. It must also provide assurance to Parliament on the integrity of the public service – and does not, and must not, take direction from Ministers in this regard. Ted correctly saw that the PSC required a complex, carefully balanced mix of institutional features and tools to carry out this role in the broader HRM landscape of the federal government.
Delegation, Accountability and Oversight
First and foremost, Ted insisted in his later years that the PSC must not only have the power, under statute, to ensure that the merit principle is observed, but should delegate this power to the managers of the public service – the deputy heads. This is exactly the model that Parliament set out in the PSEA in 2003, and the approach that the PSC has taken.
Ted also recognized that the Commission must retain the statutory powers to rescind any or all of the responsibilities delegated to deputy heads if they fail to meet acceptable standards. The PSC has those powers – and has done that.
As Ted argued, an increased focus on oversight and accountability is a necessary consequence of the highly delegated staffing system that the PSC oversees today. Deputy heads to whom the PSC has delegated appointment authority are accountable to the PSC for the exercise of this authority. The PSC relies on a continuum of tools to ensure that deputy heads exercise their delegated authorities appropriately and adhere to the values of the PSEA. These include appointment policies, staffing and assessment services, delegation and accountability instruments, monitoring, studies, audits, investigations and corrective action.
The scope of the PSC's oversight function must be as broad as the range of delegated authorities. The PSC must set out clear expectations about what is required in a well-managed, highly delegated appointment system; and then monitor and assess the integrity of the system based on those expectations.
In 2008, the PSC established an independent review committee to determine the appropriateness of its approach and level of effort on oversight, and to identify areas for improvement. The committee concluded the level of effort was appropriate overall, but some re-calibration is required. The PSC is implementing an action plan to do that.15
The PSEA gives the PSC extensive executive and administrative powers to prevent abuses and, when necessary, to take corrective action. There may be some gaps. Based on several recent audit experiences, the PSC is examining whether it requires additional authorities to conduct investigations and take corrective action based on audit findings.
The status of the PSC as an independent "agent of Parliament" was another key design element for Ted. As he succinctly put it (with Ned Franks) in 2001, "There should be only one agent of Parliament specifically for human resources management in the public service, and that agent should be the Public Service Commission".16
As an "agent of Parliament", the PSC must provide "assurance to Parliament and through Parliament to the people and public service of Canada that the merit principle is observed in recruitment and promotion in the Public Service of Canada."17 Ted (and Ned Franks) also noted that the PSC "must have sufficient resources and powers to be able to query and review the government's application in practice of the merit principle, and to report to Parliament in a useful way."18
The independence of the PSC from ministerial direction is essential for it to be an effective "agent of Parliament". While this means the PSC lacks a spokesperson in Parliament, it also means the Commission can play its role as a buffer against executive, governmental and parliamentary interference in human resources management in the public service.
Ted lamented the fact that the PSC did not, in his view, always pay enough attention to Parliament. The current President of the PSC has personally tried to foster a much stronger link with Parliament since assuming her position. Progress is being made in various ways: through the PSC's enhanced Annual Report to Parliament; with its studies on key issues such casuals as a source of indeterminate employments, time-to-staff, drop-off in employment equity groups in recruitment, acting appointments and subsequent promotion in the public service and national area of selection; in its regular appearances before House and Senate Committees; and with its frequent briefings with Parliamentarians
A Centre of Excellence in Merit
Ted argued that the PSC must also have the functions of a centre of excellence in the area of merit. This is something that Ted felt passionately about because it is "so bound up with the core functions" of the PSC.19
Merit as the Essential but Always Evolving Ideal
Ted insisted that merit must remain an essential ideal governing human resource management in the public service. He recognized, however, writing with Franks, that "it is an ideal in constant need of redefinition in light of changing circumstances and perceptions. This process of definition and redefinition must be part of a continuing dialogue between those responsible for promoting the ideal, in particular the Public Service Commission, and those responsible for applying it in the merit system within the government."20
For Ted, then, merit was a living, breathing concept, one that needed to be carefully and deliberately applied. He also contended that establishing commons tools and common measurements for the application of merit was a core function of the PSC.
As the guardian of merit in the federal HRM landscape, the PSC has a keen interest in these issues. The current PSEA introduced for the first time an explicit definition of merit. Based on monitoring more than three years of operation under the Act, we have reached the conclusion that the application of this definition is quite a bit more challenging than most anticipated
The PSC must be concerned with the integrity of individual appointments, as well as the integrity of the staffing system overall. As demonstrated in its most recent Annual Report,21 merit is generally being respected across the public service. But there are a couple of "buts" that give us cause for concern, or at least require us to ask some questions:
The first is that, while individual staffing decisions may be appropriate, the cumulative effect of many decisions may still not ensure the integrity of the staffing system overall. The PSC found signs in 2008-09 that the new definition of merit in the PSEA, which provides more discretion to managers, requires – at both the individual and system levels – a more sophisticated approach to applying the core and guiding values and weighting the values in different circumstances. We have a sense, too, that experience with implementation of the Act's definition of merit may point to a need to refine how the performance of hiring managers, organizations and the HRM system overall is measured.
Another "but" also relates to implementation. As Ted noted on several occasions, it is not enough to give managers the tools. Managers must also use the tools. The Lambert report – and Ted - addressed this issue in their assessments of the Glassco reforms and its refrain "Let the managers manage".
Here's an example.22 One of the primary expectations of the PSEA was that staffing would be faster and more efficient. The PSC's analysis shows that the average time to staff increased following the coming into force of the PSEA in December 2005 from 22.8 weeks to 24.1 weeks and then decreased to 23.5 weeks as organizations, started to adapt to the new staffing regime. The PSC believes that 23.5 weeks can be reduced by up to at least 30% within the existing legislative and policy framework and provided hiring managers adopt more proactive management approaches. The PSC did an Extreme Hiring Makeover pilot in 2008-09 and, using a strong project management approach, was able to complete an external process in just 45 calendar days.
Of course, efficiency and reductions in time to staff cannot be gained at the expense of the values of merit, non-partisanship, fairness, access, transparency and representativeness. But the PSC and others do need to find more innovative ways to ensure hiring managers can fully play their part in the staffing system.
Finally, another "but" - a very important one - relates to employees' perceptions of fairness. The Public Service Employee Survey conducted in 2008-09 found that 24% of respondents in organizations falling under the PSEA who provided an opinion did not agree that in their work unit they "hire people who can do the job"; and 35% did not agree that when they were a candidate in competitions during the previous three years "competitions were run in a fair manner". The PSC will be examining these perceptions and their implications in more detail in the year ahead.
Enabling Departments and Agencies
As a centre of expertise on merit, Ted saw that the PSC required certain powers and functions by which to enable departments and agencies to manage their delegated responsibilities. This is another essential element in his vision for the PSC.
The PSC supports organizations in the exercise of their delegated authorities in a number of ways. It provides policy guidance and practical tools for managers. It delivers a wide range of staffing and assessment services and conducts second language evaluations. The PSC also provides common systems and manages several recruitment programmes for students and post-secondary graduates. Departments and agencies rely on the PSC for all of these things - and they are key success factors for an effective, efficient highly delegated staffing system.
Looking for Ted's Counsel
It is remarkable to see how well Ted identified the key elements of what is required for the PSC to be an effective guardian of a merit-based, non-partisan public service – and how well his observations and recommendations have stood the test of time and are reflected in the PSEA and the PSC. On the whole, we are where he thought we should be. Looking forward, there are three issues where, if Ted were still alive, the PSC would be looking to him for his guidance and wise counsel.
The first issue where Ted's advice would be invaluable is recourse. Ted argued that the PSC, as a centre of expertise on merit, should, with a few limited exceptions, be responsible for hearing grievances from employees about the application of the merit principle in staffing decisions.
The Preamble to the current PSEA envisions a public service that "is characterized by fair, transparent employment practices, respect for employees, effective dialogue, and recourse aimed at resolving appointment issues."23 But the Act also introduced several important changes to the recourse aspect of the HRM landscape. "Informal discussion" was introduced for employees participating in internal appointment processes. Where the PSC delegates the authority to make internal appointments to a deputy head, the authorization must include the power to revoke those appointments and to take correction action following an investigation by the deputy head. The intent of these changes was, for the most part, to have the concerns of employees addressed in the workplace, with the exception of fraud, political influence or abuse of the authority.
In addition, the PSEA established the Public Service Staffing Tribunal to hear and decide complaints of abuse of authority in internal appointments, implementation of corrective actions ordered by the Tribunal and layoffs. An employee can also complain to the PSST that a revocation was unreasonable or that there was a failure to assess them in the official language of their choice.
So, on recourse, it is fair to say that things have moved away from Ted's vision. From the PSC's standpoint, too, the new recourse regime raises concerns. Most importantly, the PSC is not confident that the roles of deputy heads, the PSST, hiring managers and employees are sufficiently understood. The PSC also has questions about whether the right recourse approaches are in place, and whether the available recourse mechanisms are being used effectively. One issue it is examining, for instance, is the rationale for maintaining different recourse options for internal and external processes, especially when employees are more and more participating in processes open to the public and given access is a guiding staffing value.
Undoubtedly, the application of a little bit of Ted's administrative archaeology would help figure out what is going on and what needs to be done when it comes to recourse in the HRM landscape.
The second issue where the PSC would be seeking Ted's advice is the non-partisanship of the public service. Prior to the establishment of the Civil Service Commission in 1908, political interference in the federal public service was standard practice. Under the spoils system of the day, the operating principle was straight forward: "Serve the party day and night, secure us an electoral triumph by fair means or foul, and you shall be quartered for life on the public treasury".24
Protecting the core value of a non-partisan public service was a lifelong preoccupation for Ted. In his 2001 report for the Canadian Centre for Management Developed with Franks, he noted that: "One of the primary concerns of the approach to human resources management in the Canadian government has, for over eighty years, been to create a non-partisan public service capable of service to successive governments of different political stripes."25
For Ted, the non-partisanship of the public service was inherently intertwined with merit. As mentioned earlier, merit was for him about requiring competence and qualifications for the job and ensuring the absence of patronage and non-partisanship. There must not be any political influence in appointments and promotions; and public servants must be "politically neutral in the sense that successive governments of different political stripes will be confident in their impartiality and commitment to serving the government of the day". Ted was also consistently emphatic that, "Because of the risks of patronage and partisanship, individual departmental ministers cannot, and must not, have responsibility for human resources manage in their departments."26
As a top-drawer administrative archaeologist, Ted was not just concerned about the past. He insisted on applying the lens of the past to the future. At the millennium, he saw two important challenges for preserving the non-partisanship of the public service in the years ahead. The first was the need, following the Supreme Court of Canada's Osborne decision, to establish clearer ground rules for limiting the participation of public servants in partisan political activities. The second was what he described as "the displacement of public administration by public management".27 In his view, the displacement risked collapsing the two worlds of elected politicians and permanent public administrators into one, thereby eroding Canada's permanent, career public service and its system of democratic government.
While the PSC has undergone many changes since 1908, its mandate to safeguard the non-partisan character of the public service has remained constant. It must ensure that appointments to and promotions within the public service are made free from political influence; and that public servants do not impair, or are not perceived as impairing, their ability to perform their duties in a politically impartial manner.
The approach for carrying out these responsibilities has evolved. As in Ted's vision, the current PSEA confirms, in its Preamble, that non-partisanship is a core value of the public service that must be independently safeguarded for the benefit of Canadians. In addition, in response to the Osborne decision, Part 7 of the Act established an enhanced regime for regulating the political activities of public servants at the federal, provincial, territorial and municipal levels. Part 7 explicitly recognizes the right of an employee to engage in political activity, as defined in the Act, so long as it does not impair, or is not perceived as impairing, the employee's ability to perform his or her duties in a politically impartial manner.
Under the regime set out in Part 7, employees seeking nomination as, or being, candidates in an election must first seek permission from the PSC. Employees carrying out activities not related to candidacy are responsible for examining their own specific circumstances to determine whether or not they would impair, or be seen to impair, their ability to perform their duties in a politically impartial manner. The PSC may investigate allegations that federal public servants are engaged in improper political activities and, in founded cases, may order corrective action.
In 2008-09, the PSC received 54 new requests for permission to seek nomination as, or to be, a candidate in an election, a 20% increase over the previous year. The vast majority of requests relate to municipal elections. The PSC is already taking steps to streamline the process for approving municipal candidacy requests. Last year the PSC also completed 17 investigations into allegations of improper political activities. In most cases, individuals had not sought necessary permission from PSC.
Looking forward, like Ted, the PSC sees several emerging risks related to safeguarding non-partisanship. In fact, in its 2008-09 Annual Report, the PSC concludes that the past three years of operation under the current PSEA demonstrate that more vigilance is required to ensure Canadians will continue to benefit from a non-partisan public service in the years ahead. There are a few reasons why:28
- The PSC's recent investigations have had to deal with increasingly complex situations. Two of its investigations last year were not related to candidacy – but instead investigation allegations of improper political activity. One of them was determined to be founded.
- The significant efforts underway to renew the federal public service mean that tens of thousands of new recruits will need to learn what it means to be a public servant in a professional, non-partisan public service – what their roles and responsibilities are, both individually and collectively.
- Technology is also having an impact. Social networking websites like Twitter and Facebook are helping to blur the lines between the professional and personal lives of public servants and give more visibility to political activities or affiliations that may undermine the political neutrality of the public service.
The PSC is committed to playing a leadership role in the significant reconsideration that is required in this area. It has already begun a dialogue with academics, current and former public servants and others on what a non-partisan public service should look like in the coming decades, what behaviour should be expected and what the appropriate balance is between individual and collective interests.
Another major objective for the PSC is to examine whether the existing governance regime is appropriate, or whether adjustments in the mix of tools and approaches are necessary to safeguard the core value of non-partisanship in the years ahead. One thing it will be looking at is whether the PSC should use its regulatory power to set out additional rules to govern the behaviour of public servants.
The PSC would have welcomed Ted's thoughts on all of these matters, especially how to ensure that the vision in the PSEA of a non-partisan public service is fully institutionalized.
3. The Scope of the PSC's Mandate
The last issue the PSC would have greatly appreciated Ted's views on is the scope of the PSC's mandate. This is something that Ted thought quite a lot about.
In 1918, Parliament determined that appointments to and within the entire public service, including the "outside public service" – that is, the public service outside Ottawa – would be subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Civil Service Commission. Almost immediately, pressures mounted for exceptions to the requirement that appointments be merit-based and non-partisan. The locality preference and the veterans preference are the best examples.
More recently, Ted's work on the administrative state in the 1980s documented the rise of a "parallel" universe of boards, commissions, Crown corporations and other arm's-length organizations created outside the scope of the PSEA and the PSC. There were often public policy reasons for doing so. At the same time, as Hodgetts showed, there were also instances where organizations were deliberately kept out of the PSC universe to avoid the red-tape associated with recruitment and promotion and to gain freedom from the complex HRM regime of the core public service, including the requirement that employees not impair or be seen to impair the political impartiality of the public service.
The boundary issue remains today. From the PSC's standpoint, there are several concerns. The first is the appointment of former Governor-in-Council (GIC) appointees to the public service. GIC appointees are appointed by Ministers. Public servants are appointed by the PSC, which is independent from ministerial direction. Based on its oversight activities, the PSC is concerned about evidence of instances where public service positions are tailored to former GIC appointees, or where former GIC appointees are appointed to the public service but merit is met, or cannot be demonstrated.
Another boundary issue relates to the scope of Part 7 of the PSEA. Part 7 currently applies to employees in organizations for which the PSC has the exclusive authority to make appointments, as well certain separate agencies, such as the Canadian Institutes of Health Research. Should its scope be broadened to include some or all of the broader federal public sector? While there would certainly be challenges in extending the expectation that public servants must act and be seen to act in a politically impartial manner beyond the core public service, to say that it should not be considered full stop, ignores the collective impacts of inappropriate behaviour on the liberal democratic state.
On all three issues – recourse, non-partisanship and the scope of the PSEA – the PSC knows Ted would have had something very insightful to say.
Professor Ted Hodgetts was both bookish and eminently practical. When it came to the PSC, he was the first among equals in articulating what the Commission requires to carry out its responsibility to safeguard merit and non-partisanship in the federal public service, on behalf of Parliament and, through Parliament, to Canadians.
Today, Ted's administrative archaeology is more relevant than ever. The PSC is currently taking stock of the PSEA, whether it is achieving what it was intended to achieve and how it can be improved. It is also preparing to contribute to the required five-year review of the Public Service Modernization Act – which includes the PSEA – and which the President of the Treasury Board is leading. In both of these endeavours and others, Ted would have made a great contribution. He is missed.
Canadian Centre for Management Development, "Parliament and Human Resources Management: The Role of the Public Service Commission as an Agent of Parliament", a paper prepared by C.E.S. Franks and J.E. Hodgetts, Ottawa: 2001.
Canadian Centre for Management Development, "Public Management: Emblem of Reform for the Canadian Public Service", the John L. Manion Lecture by J.E. Hodgetts, Ottawa: 1991, p. 3.
Hackett, Bruce M., J.E. Hodgetts, Morton Kroll and Lloyd D. Musolf, The Changing Public Service. Davis: University of California, 1968.
Hodgetts, J.E. "Bureaucratic Initiatives, Citizen Involvement, and the Quest for Administrative Accountability", Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, Series IV, Vol. XII (1974), pp. 227-236.
Hodgetts, J.E., "Canadian Administration Faces the Fifth Decade", J. of Politics, 11:4 (Nov. 1949), pp. 715-735.
Hodgetts, J.E., "The Liberal and the Bureaucrat: A Rose by Any Other Name", Queen's Quarterly, LXII: 2 (summer), pp.176-183.
Hodgetts, J.E., "Royal Commissions and Public Service Reform: Personal Reflections", CPA, 50:4 (winter 2007), pp. 525-540.
Hodgetts,J.E., "Royal Commissions of Inquiry in Canada", PAR, 9:1 (winter 1949), pp. 22-29.
Hodgetts, J.E., William McCloskey, Reginald Whitaker and V. Seymour Wilson, The Biography of an Institution: The Civil Service Commission of Canada, 1908-1967, Ottawa: Public Service Commission of Canada, 1972.
1 John Meisel, "Foreward", in O.P. Dwivedi, ed. (1982), The Administrative State in Canada: Essays in Honour of J.E. Hodgetts, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, p. ix. [Return]
2 Professor Hodgetts became the editorial director of the Royal Commission on Government Organization in 1960 and was one of the four commissioners named to the Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability, 1977-79. [Return]
3 J.E. Hodgetts, William McCloskey, Reginald Whitaker and V. Seymour Wilson (1972) The Biography of an Institution: The Civil Service Commission of Canada, 1908-1967, Ottawa: Public Service Commission of Canada. [Return]
4 Luc Juillet and Ken Rasmussen (2008), Defending a Contested Ideal: Merit and the PSC of Canada, 1908-2008, Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press. [Return]
5 See generally Hodgetts et al. (1972), Ibid. [Return]
6 See, e.g., J. E. Hodgetts, "The Changing Nature of the Public Service: The Canadian View" in Bruce M. Hackett et al. (1968), The Changing Public Service, Davis: Institute of Governmental Affairs, University of California, pp. 9-50. [Return]
7 See O.P. Dwivedi, ed., Ibid. [Return]
8 Canadian Centre for Management Development (2001), "Parliament and Human Resources Management: The Role of the Public Service Commission as an Agent of Parliament", a paper prepared by C.E.S. Franks and J.E. Hodgetts, Ottawa, p. 4. [Return]
9 CCMD (2001), Ibid., p. 4. [Return]
10 CCMD (2001), Ibid., p. 4. [Return]
11 Proceedings of the House of Commons, 37th Parliament, 2nd Session, Second Reading of Bill C-25, which became the Public Service Modernization Act, February 14, 2003. [Return]
12 Proceedings of the House of Commons, 37th Parliament, 2nd Session, Second Reading of Bill C-25, which became the Public Service Modernization Act, February 14, 2003. [Return]
13 Public Service Employment Act, 2003, c. 22, ss. 12, 13. [Return]
14 See Lavigne c. Canada (Justice) at http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fr/2009/2009cf684/2009cf684.html, para. 59. [Return]
15 See Public Service Commission of Canada, Annual Report 2008-2009, Ottawa, 2009, pp. 146-154. [Return]
16 CCMD (2001), Ibid., p. 3. [Return]
17 CCMD (2001), Ibid., p. 1. [Return]
18 CCMD (2001), Ibid., p. 19. [Return]
19 He articulated his view most recently in CCMD (2001), Ibid. See p. 6. See also Hodgetts et al. (1972), Ibid. [Return]
20 CCMD (2001), Ibid., p. 1. This is also a central idea in Juillet and Rasmussen (2008). [Return]
21 See PSC (2009), Ibid. [Return]
22 See PSC (2009), Ibid., especially pages 9-10 and 88-94. [Return]
23 Public Service Employment Act, 2003, c. 22, ss. 12, 13. [Return]
24 Canadian Monthly, 1876. [Return]
25 CCMD (2001), Ibid., p.1. [Return]
26 He articulated this view most recently in CCMD (2001), Ibid., p. 2 [Return]
27 Canadian Centre for Management Development (1991), "Public Management: Emblem of Reform for the Canadian Public Service", the John L. Manion Lecture by J.E. Hodgetts, Ottawa, p. 3. [Return]
28 See PSC (2009), Ibid., pp. 13-16. [Return]
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